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I. INTRODUCTION
“Every time I take my oxy, as soon as I swallow the water and pills there’s
this anxiety that just completely dissipates from my mind and body . . . there’s
this instantaneous relief.”1 This is not a unique reaction: pharmaceutical
companies designed drugs like OxyContin to have this effect on patients. 2 These
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred December 2020;
B.S. Criminal Justice, Italian, Texas Christian University, 2018. I cannot thank my family and friends enough
for their love, support, and encouragement. A special thanks to my parents for always believing in my dreams
even in times when I did not, and to Cameron Skreden for being the brightest light in my life. I would also like
to thank the UPLR staff, Professor Levine, and everyone who provided guidance and advice to me in writing
this article. Finally, my biggest thanks go out to all the front-line responders, medical professionals, social
workers, community activists, and everyone in between working tirelessly to make our communities a better
and healthier place for all.
1.
Feedagoat2169,
Opiates,
REDDIT
(Oct.
21,
2019),
https://www.reddit.com/r/opiates/comments/dkxbjb/anybody_else_get_this_instantaneous_feeling_of/ (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. See Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely Abused,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html (on
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same companies then simultaneously marketed the drugs as safe and effective,
with low potentials for abuse.3 Yet over the past twenty years, these drugs took
hold of American society and led to one of the greatest health crises in the
nation’s history.4
Recently, massive lawsuits put the pharmaceutical companies and their
actions in the spotlight.5 Maura Healey, Massachusetts Attorney General,
highlighted the national sentiment when she said, “[w]e owe it to families in
Massachusetts and across the country to hold Purdue and the Sacklers
accountable, ensure the evidence of what they did is made public, and make them
pay for the damage they have caused.”6 After years of fraudulent and deceitful
behavior, pharmaceutical companies finally are facing their day in court. 7
When looking at the opioid crisis, many parties potentially warrant blame:
big pharma for making the drugs, the government for lacking oversight, and
individuals themselves for abusing the drugs.8 Yet the conversation seemingly
ignores one party that might have more fault in perpetuating the epidemic than
any other single actor. 9

file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how Purdue Pharma designed OxyContin to
have far higher narcotic levels than standard, increasing its pain-killing ability).
3. See SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND 127 (2015) (“One question [that sales reps for Purdue] addressed
concerned the risk of addiction to pain patients when treated with narcotics. ‘The correct answer was ‘less than
one percent.’”); see also Meier, supra note 2 (reflecting on how Purdue Pharma “trained sales representatives to
tell doctors that OxyContin was less addictive and prone to abuse than competing opioids”).
4. See Patrick McGrath, Legal Strategies Unfold as Opioid Lawsuits Rise, 16 MASS TORTS LITIG. 15, 16
(2018) (quoting President Trump when he weighed in on the opioid epidemic, calling it the worst public health
crisis in American history); see also Meier, supra note 2 (numbering the death toll from overdoses involving
prescription opioids over the past two decades to more than 200,000 people).
5. Nick Castle, Colin Dwyer & Brian Mann, Not Just Purdue: Big Drug Companies Considering
Settlements
to
Resolve
Opioid
Suits,
NPR
(Aug.
28,
2019,
12:10
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/28/755007841/several-big-drug-companies-considering-massive-settlements-toresolve-opioid-sui (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Nuala Sawyer Bishari, S.F. Files
Lawsuit Against Big Pharma Over Opioid Crisis, SF WEEKLY (Dec. 20, 2018, 1:16 PM),
http://www.sfweekly.com/news/s-f-files-lawsuit-against-big-pharma-over-opioid-crisis/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that San Francisco joined 1,200 other cities and counties across
America that are suing Purdue, McKesson, and other drug manufacturers for their role in the nationwide opioid
crisis).
6. Castle, Dwyer & Mann, supra note 5.
7. See id. (examining the numerous lawsuits big pharmaceutical companies face, including the state case
Johnson & Johnson lost in Oklahoma).
8. See generally Meier, supra note 2 (exploring Purdue Pharma’s role in perpetrating the opioid crisis);
see Jacey Fortin, D.E.A. Let Opioid Production Surge as Crisis Grew, Justice Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/dea-opioid-crisis.html (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (uncovering how the Drug Enforcement Administration (“D.E.A.”) authorized large increases in
opioid painkiller production despite the growing number of opioid-related deaths in the United States); see also
Anna Edney & Lauren Etter, Quicktake: The Opioid Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2019, 1:28 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/heroin (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining how some prescription painkiller addicts turned to heroin, thereby increasing heroin and other
synthetic opioid use).
9. See Ronald Hirsch, The Opioid Epidemic: It’s Time to Place Blame Where It Belongs, 114 MO. MED.
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Physicians play a unique role in the opioid crisis due to their control over
dispensing and prescribing opioid-based drugs to patients. 10 Opioids became
popular in pain management for a reason: they treat pain in ways other drugs
cannot.11 For many years, prescribing opioids was more than just the norm; it was
essentially a requirement. 12 Yet despite the pervasiveness of the drugs, only a few
cases of physicians facing individual liability for prescribing opioids exist.13
Rarely is a physician’s prescription of opioids negligent.14 Of course, there
are many legitimate circumstances where opioids are the best—and sometimes
only—option to treat a patient’s pain.15 However, patients should have the
opportunity to hold bad acting physicians liable for their negligent conduct. 16
Medical malpractice is the most common avenue where patients can recover
against physicians for harmful treatment.17 However, uncertainty remains if
medical malpractice law can currently provide the proper remedy to patients in
this new and complex age of opioid addiction.18
This Comment examines how the opioid crisis changed the standard of care

82, 82 (2017) (describing physicians as “innocent bystanders” within the opioid crisis).
10. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 82; see Joanne Finnegan, Major Chains Including CVS, Walmart Say
Physicians–Not Pharmacists–Responsible for Fueling Opioid Crisis, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jan. 8, 2020, 1:24
PM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/practices/major-pharmacy-chains-file-lawsuits-saying-physicians-notpharmacists-are-responsible (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A prescription for a
controlled substance is an order for a medication that may be issued only be a physician or other authorized
healthcare practitioner.”).
11. See Marilyn Serafini, The Physicians’ Quandry with Opioids: Pain Versus Addiction, NEJM
CATALYST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/quandary-opioids-chronic-pain-addiction/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting a patient’s success story of using opioids to treat her
chronic pain that other non-opioid prescription drugs could not treat).
12. Sarah Kliff, The Opioid Crisis Changed How Doctors Think About Pain, VOX (June 5, 2017, 6:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/2017/6/5/15111936/opioid-crisis-pain-west-virginia (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
13. See generally Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding a physician liable for
his negligent prescribing patterns); see generally County Com’n of McDowell County v. McKesson Corp., 362
F. Supp. 3d 639 (S.D.W. Va. 2017) (alleging that a doctor provided written opioids prescriptions for patients,
despite knowing that the drugs were likely abused, diverted, or misused).
14. See David Studdert, et al., Changes in Practice Among Physicians with Malpractice Claims, 380
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1247, 1248 (2019) (“A small group of physicians accounts for a disproportionately large
share of all malpractice claims and patient complaints.”).
15. See Will Stone, Patients with Chronic Pain Feel Caught in an Opioid-Prescribing Debate,
HEALTHLEADERS (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/clinical-care/patients-chronic-pain-feelcaught-opioid-prescribing-debate (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how
Arizona’s law on opioid prescribing limits exempts cancer, trauma, end-of-life, and other serious cases from the
prescribing limits because of the necessity of these drugs for those situations).
16. Infra Part IV.
17.
See What is Medical Malpractice?, AM. BOARD OF PROF. LIABILITY ATT’YS,
https://www.abpla.org/what-is-malpractice (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (listing the different types of physician malpractice that can lead to patient recovery, including
“failure to diagnose or misdiagnosis”, “improper medication or dosage”, “poor follow-up or aftercare”, “failure
to recognize symptoms”, or “disregarding or not taking appropriate patient history.”).
18. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, Emergency Room Physician, Kaiser Permanente (Jan. 7,
2020) (notes on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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in medical malpractice cases and ultimately proposes a new standard that courts
should apply.19 Because of the drugs’ unique background and role in the medical
community, using the initial physician prescription of opioids as the only metric
to determine physician liability is deficient. 20 Only considering the prescription
as the liability producing conduct fails to account for the inherent complexity of
these cases.21 Instead, when determining potential medical malpractice liability
for treating a patient with opioids, this new standard of care considers the
physician’s conduct during the entirety of the physician–patient interaction.22
Examining the interaction as a whole promotes both better physician conduct and
patient well-being because it allows for advantageous use of opioids and ensures
certain patients have access to opioid treatments they need.23
This Comment begins by providing an overview of the opioid crisis in
America from its background to why physicians still treat patients with opioids. 24
It then examines physician liability in general and what the traditional medical
malpractice case entails.25 Next, it explores what should make up the relevant
standard of care in a case involving physician misconduct in connection with
opioids.26 Finally, it proposes a new standard of care based on the relevant
information available to a physician and best practices of prescribing opioids for
courts to utilize in these cases. 27 Such decisions based on this information and
context of the opioid crisis can promote conscious prescribing and safer patient
treatment.28
II. OPIOIDS IN AMERICA
The story of opioids in America is one of pain and how Americans tried to
treat it.29 Since their modern introduction into the medical community roughly
thirty years ago, opioids have become one of the deadliest parts of American
society.30 Section A explains the basics behind the unique scientific makeup of

19. Infra Part IV.
20. Infra Part IV.
21. Infra Part IV.
22. Infra Part IV.
23. Infra Part IV.
24. Infra Part II.
25. Infra Part III.
26. Infra Part IV.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part IV.
29. EJ Dickson, How the Opioid Epidemic Became a Uniquely American Problem, THE ROLLING STONE
(Apr. 4, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/opioid-epidemic-americanproblem-817756/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
30. See Lilly Dancyger, Americans Now More Likely to Die From Opioids Than Car Crashes, THE
ROLLING STONE (Jan. 15, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/opioid-od-killmore-than-car-accidents-779489/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing a report
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opioid drugs.31 Section B provides insight on the history of opioids and the
current opioid epidemic in America. 32 Section C explores how and why
physicians use opioids to treat patients. 33
A. What are opioids?
English physician Thomas Sydenham noted in 1680 that “[a]mong the
remedies which it has pleased almighty God to give to man to relieve his
sufferings, none is so universal and so efficacious as opium.”34 Opium comes
directly from the inner bulb of a mature poppy plant.35 For centuries, civilizations
hailed opium’s immense power to soothe pain and induce sleepiness. 36 From this
opium, scientists developed the opioid-based medications. 37
Opioids are “seductively powerful.”38 The drugs’ seductiveness relates to
how they chemically react once in the body.39 Opioid medications work by
binding to receptors located in the brain and spinal cord.40 These receptors
produce pleasure sensations when they interact with endorphins. 41 David
Juurlink, a specialist with the Sunnybrook Research Institute, compared opioids
to “the key” and the receptors in the brain to “a lock.”42 “The key enters the lock
and changes it.”43
Prescription opioid medications contain potency similar to heroin.44 Over
time, patients can develop a tolerance to opioid-based medications and require
higher dosages to achieve the same amount of pain relief. 45 Such tolerance—
combined with dependence—can lead prescription opioid users to begin using
from the National Safety Council, which found that “Americans are more likely to die from an opioid overdose
than in a car accident.”).
31. Infra Section II.A.
32. Infra Section II.B.
33. Infra Section II.C.
34. Tuan Trang, et al., Pain and Poppies: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Opioids Analgesics, 35 J.
OF NEUROSCIENCE 13879, 13885 (2015).
35. QUINONES, supra note 3, at 38.
36. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 52 (listing the various civilizations that cultivated poppies and
extracted opium from them, including the Sumerians the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Venetians).
37. What are Opioids?, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/opioids/what-areopioids.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); James
Hamblin, The Opioid Reckoning Will Not Be Just, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/08/opioid-justice/597064/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
38. Kliff, supra note 12.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. QUINONES, supra note 3, at 38.
42. Kliff, supra note 12.
43. Id.
44. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 124 (“Molecularly, oxycodone is similar to heroin.”); Hamblin, supra
note 37.
45. Kliff, supra note 12; JOHNS HOPKINS MED., supra note 37.
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heroin.46 A National Institute of Drug Abuse study revealed that between 2008
and 2009, 86% of heroin users once used opioid pain relievers before using
heroin.47 Thus, many question why medical professionals employ such toxic and
addictive drugs in their treatments.48
B. Opioids: From Past to Present
Commentators agree that “[t]he scale of America’s opioid epidemic is
shocking.”49 Physicians knew of the extreme power these drugs had to treat pain
since the early 1900s.50 Yet it was not until the 1990s that the use of opioid
medications drastically increased.51 Two primary factors drove this increase: the
medical profession’s campaign to treat patient pain and the vigorous marketing
of OxyContin by Purdue Pharma.52 In roughly the decade following the
emergence of these factors, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) noted a fourfold rise in prescription-related opioid overdose fatalities. 53
Beginning with the campaign to treat patient pain, physicians learned that
pain was “the fifth vital sign,” and that they had to keep pain “well controlled.”54
46. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 192 (describing the cycle of how addicts turn to cheaper street drugs
like heroin after their tolerance to prescription opioids such as OxyContin builds up and such prescription drugs
can no longer provide the relief they seek); Prescription Opioids and Heroin, NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE,
https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/rx_and_heroin_rrs_layout_final.pdf (last visited Dec.
29, 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, supra note 46.
48. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 125 (“[N]o one had imagined that a pill containing a drug similar to
heroin would be marketed almost like an over-the-counter drug.”); see also Dave Chase, Industry Voices – We
Still Need to Convince Doctors to Stop Prescribing So Many Opioids, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Sept. 14, 2018,
12:15
AM),
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/hospitals-health-systems/industry-voices-we-still-need-toconvince-doctors-to-stop-prescribing-so (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“So why is the
country still facing epidemic proportions of opioid addiction and death?”).
49. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, AND MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID
EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 17
(2017) (“Drug overdose, driven primarily by opioids, is now the leading cause of unintentional injury death in
the United States.”); see also Lawrence Lewis, et al., The Opioid Crisis in Missouri: A Call to Action for
Physicians, Legislators, and Society, 114 MO. MED. 440, 440 (2017) (noting that deaths due to opioid overdose
increased in the past 15 years over 400%); German Lopez, How to Stop the Deadliest Drug Overdose Crisis in
American History, VOX (Dec. 21, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2017/8/1/15746780/opioid-epidemic-end (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
50. See Dickson, supra note 29 (noting how physicians in the early 1900s recognized the deadliness of
opium after patients died from morphine overdoses).
51. Salley Satel, The Truth About Painkiller Addiction, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/what-america-got-wrong-about-opioid-crisis/595090/
(on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Hamblin, supra note 37; see Kliff, supra note 12 (noting that neurosurgeon James Campbell argued
for a change in pain management at the 1996 American Pain Society annual conference, saying that “[i]f pain
were assessed with the same zeal as other vital signs are, it would have a much better chance of being treated
properly . . . [w]e need to train doctors and nurses to treat pain as a vital sign.”).
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There was a stigma in the medical community that if a physician did not treat
patients with opioids, the physician did something wrong.55 Physicians had to do
more than just treat pain—they had to cure it.56 This focused their treatment
solely on pain, while ignoring the potential for a patient to develop a tolerance or
addiction to the drugs.57
Powerful commercial opioid painkillers emerged as the medical profession’s
focus on pain increased.58 The drugs offered the level of relief both patients in
severe pain and physicians sought.59 Drug manufacturers took note, and, as the
medical community pursued more aggressive pain treatment, companies like
Purdue Pharma released drugs such as OxyContin into the market. 60
The timing of the confluence of these two factors led to a perfect storm of
over-prescription.61 In an effort to fully treat pain, physicians gradually
prescribed patients more opioid medications. 62 Treating patients with opioid
medications “was no longer a controversial opinion in America.” 63 Physicians
could treat patient pain like they never could before, and patients now had hope
they could live pain free.64
C. Physicians and Opioids
Physicians, at their most basic level, have an obligation to treat patient pain,
and opioids remain one of the most effective medications physicians can use to
fulfill this obligation.65 Opioids relieve pain almost like no other drug—so much
so that they inherited the name the “medicine of the gods.” 66 Section 1 looks to
the medical uses for opioid drugs.67 Section 2 then examines the modern trends in
55. Hamblin, supra note 37; Kliff, supra note 12.
56. Kliff, supra note 12.
57. Hamblin, supra note 37.
58. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 84 (“In 1984 Purdue Frederick . . . released MS Contin . . . for cancer
and postoperative patients.”); Kliff, supra note 12.
59. See Kliff, supra note 12 (“There was a push that we had to get pain to zero . . . Hydrocodone worked
well at that – too well, because patients became addicted, and kept needing more and more to control their
pain.”).
60. Id.
61. See Mark R. Jones, et al., A Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain Medicine, 7
PAIN AND THERAPY 13, 15–16 (2018) (describing the confluence of the influential “pain as the fifth vital sign”
campaign and the massive push from companies like Purdue Pharma about the benefits of these drugs).
62. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 84–85 (highlighting how physicians responded to these drugs by
using them to treat almost any ailment they came across and “began treating more patients with this kind of pain
control.”); see also Jones, et al., supra note 61, at 16 (listing the climbing numbers of opioid consumption in the
United States from 46,946 kg in 2000 to 165,525 kg in 2012).
63. QUINONES, supra note 3, at 85.
64. Id.
65. Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe
Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J. LAW MED. 7, 8 (2016).
66. Walter Ling, Prescription Opioid Addiction and Chronic Pain: More than a Feeling, 173 DRUG AND
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 73, 74 (2017).
67. Infra Section II.C.1.
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prescribing an opioid-based treatment.68
1. Medicinal Benefits of Opioids
Physicians traditionally prescribe opioids to patients with chronic pain, which
is pain lasting more than three to six months.69 Non-cancer chronic pain is one of
the most prevalent and incapacitating medical conditions in the United States. 70
For patients suffering with diseases such as multiple sclerosis, arthritis, or
chronic migraines, opioids offer real relief from debilitating pain.71
Physicians also commonly prescribe opioids for severe, acute pain,
occurring, for example, after surgery.72 Depending on the severity of the pain and
its inception, the actual drug prescribed and its respective dosage can vary.73 In
either situation, opioids remain “quintessential drugs in a physician’s
pharmacological toolbox.”74
Addiction is a risk among all patients, regardless of whether the treatment is
short or long term.75 Most patients, though, do not form a physical dependence or
an addiction from exposure to opioids.76 This health risk is of low frequency, but
high danger.77 Yet even despite the low frequency of opioid addiction, addiction

68. Infra Section II.C.2.
69. Ling, supra note 66, at 74.
70. Nora Volkow & Thomas McLellan, Opioid Abuse in Chronic Pain – Misconceptions and Mitigation
Strategies, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1253 (2016).
71. See Martha Cornell & Anthony Guarino, Opioids as a Treatment for MS Patients with Chronic Pain,
7 INT’L J. OF MS CARE 10, 10 (2005) (explaining how opioids can be “powerful and potentially effective pain”
treatment for patients suffering from multiple sclerosis); Trang, et al., supra note 34, at 13879–80.
72. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 53 (“Opioids have long been
used successfully to treat acute postsurgical and postprocedural pain.”); Harvard Women’s Health Watch, When
Are
Opioids
Safe
to
Take?,
HARVARD
HEALTH
PUBLISHING
(Mar.
2015),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/pain/when-are-opioids-safe-to-take (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
73. See Harvard Women’s Health Watch, supra note 72 (describing how patients “may need the drugs
only for two or three days” or longer, depending on the operation and pain level).
74. Trang, et al., supra note 34, at 13879.
75. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 55 (examining how studies
show tolerance can build up in both patients on short-and long-term treatments).
76. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 210 (“It is important to
acknowledge that an overwhelming majority of people who use prescription opioids do not continue to use them
chronically.”); see also Volkow & McLellan, supra note 70, at 1255–57 (defining physical dependence as an
individual’s repeated administration of opioid drugs that will “inevitably” result in development of tolerance
and physical dependence through the body getting used to the drug’s effects; and defining addiction as
something that develops slowly over a period of months of exposure that produce such effects as “prolonged
craving for the drug, obsessive thinking about the drug, erosion of inhibitory control over efforts to refrain from
drug use, and compulsive drug taking.”).
77. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 191 (totaling OxyContin abusers to 6.1 million people, which is
roughly 2.4% of the American population); Volkow & McLellan, supra note 70, at 1256; see also Greg Amer,
Why Some People Become Addicted to Opioids While Others Don’t, FAIRVIEW (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.fairview.org/Blog/Why-Some-People-Become-Addicted-to-Opioids-While-Others-Dont (on file
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will always remain a risk because of the chemical nature of opioids, and it is
unlikely that any single behavior change can alleviate that risk. 78
Opioids are unique in the narcotics world.79 Unlike street drugs, the
government supervises and controls opioid distribution under the veil of the
prescribing medical professionals.80 The pills do not originate on the street but
rather come from a doctor’s hands by way of a prescription.81 This puts
physicians in a unique position to fight the opioid crisis on a more personal
level.82
2. Modern Trends in Opioid Treatment
Medical professionals are moving away from emphasizing the prominent role
pain management had in the early 2000s.83 In November 2015, two physicians
reiterated this trend, stating that “[i]f you focus on just pain intensity, the
tendency is just to use opioids, because opioids are the only thing that will reduce
pain so immediately.”84 The measure of good patient treatment is not whether
pain disappears, but rather it is getting people back to the activities that pain once
prevented.85
This was a controversial viewpoint at the time, especially because it
potentially created the risk of improper treatment.86 Eventually the viewpoint
caught on and the American Medical Association voted to denounce the use of
pain as a vital sign, significantly altering the profession’s focus. 87 The CDC
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how someone’s genetic makeup likely explains how
addiction impacts humans differently, which helps explain why only 10–15% of the American population
struggles with addiction issues).
78. Volkow & McLellan, supra note 70, at 1257.
79. Hamblin, supra note 37.
80. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 25 (“[M]ost other prescription
opioids are not regulated under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970 as Schedule II drugs–those with a
‘high potential for abuse which may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.’”); Hamblin, supra
note 37.
81. Hamblin, supra note 37.
82. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 189 (speaking to all the ailments physicians used to prescribe opioids
for and could potentially refrain from prescribing opioids for in the future).
83. See Kliff, supra note 12 (describing how doctors are now concerned with overtreating pain).
84. Id.
85. Jane Ballantyne & Mark Sullivan, Intensity of Chronic Pain–The Wrong Metric?, 373 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2098, 2099 (2015).
86. See Kliff, supra note 12 (listing the criticism the physicians received from this article, including one
commentator arguing that “thinking about pain in this way would ‘result in human misery on a massive
scale.’”).
87. Joyce Frieden, Remove Pain as 5th Vital Sign, AMA Urged, MEDPAGE TODAY (June 13, 2016),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/meetingcoverage/ama/58486 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review); see Vital Signs (Body Temperature, Pulse Rate, Respiration Rate, Blood Pressure), JOHNS HOPKINS
MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/vital-signs-body-temperature-pulserate-respiration-rate-blood-pressure (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (defining vital signs as “measurements of the body’s most basic functions”, including body
temperature, pulse, breathing rate, and blood pressure); see also Kliff, supra note 12 (“the notion of ‘pain as the
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followed suit shortly afterwards, issuing conservative guidelines for prescribing
opioids to patients with chronic pain.88
Overall, prescribing numbers are down, causing some to think the tide is
turning on the country’s battle against opioid addiction.89 Yet this move away
from emphasizing pain management presents a troubling situation for those with
chronic pain who potentially cannot obtain the treatment they need.90
Opioids are “the most rapidly effective drugs for relieving pain.”91 In
addition to not providing patients with potentially life-saving drugs, ending
opioid treatment or rapidly decreasing dosages can have dangerous
consequences.92 In April 2019, the CDC and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) clarified that stopping opioid treatment altogether “can
result in severe opioid withdrawal symptoms” and can lead patients to “seek
other sources of opioids.”93 Reducing access to prescription medication could
lead a patient to use other drugs, such as heroin or fentanyl, to achieve the pain
relief he or she seeks. 94 Not focusing on providing other forms of treatment and
simply cutting off access to opioid painkillers does not solve America’s opioid
crisis.95
Imposing potential liability for merely prescribing opioids leaves certain
patients without any options for relief at all because it could cut off access to the
drugs altogether.96 Completely eliminating opioid painkillers is not the answer as
they still provide a plethora of medicinal benefits. 97 The answer lies in taking this
information and creating a legal standard to encourage better practices and safer
use of the drugs as a whole.98
fifth vital sign’ . . . although intended to promote pain assessment and effective treatment, in general contributed
to an increase in opioid prescribing.”).
88. THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 35–36.
89. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 51 (“There are indications that
opioid prescribing is decreasing.”); Satel, supra note 51.
90. See Kliff, supra note 12 (noting one patient’s comment on the article: “Why, with chronic pain
disease, would we not treat the pain??”).
91. Ballantyne & Sullivan, supra note 85, at 2098.
92. Keith A. Reynolds, Opioid Crisis Fallout: Physicians Increasingly Avoid Treating Chronic Pain
Patients, Survey Finds, MED. ECON. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/news/opioid-crisisfallout-physicians-increasingly-avoid-treating-chronic-pain-patients-survey-finds (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
93. Id.
94. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 269 (recalling how all of the addicts a physician working in a drug
treatment center sees started using OxyContin before moving to heroin or other drugs); Stephen Gelfand, The
Perils of Pain Meds Revisited, THE RHEUMATOLOGIST (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.therheumatologist.org/article/the-perils-of-pain-meds-revisited/?singlepage=1&theme=print-friendly (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
95. Gelfand, supra note 94.
96. See Trang, et al., supra note 34, at 13879 (mentioning the powerful treatment powers that opioids
have for those patients with chronic pain or severe, acute pain).
97. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18.
98. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18; see Infra Section IV.C (identifying the
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III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
Due to the inherent risks of their profession, physicians face various types of
liability.99 The most traditional form of liability physicians face is medical
malpractice—when a physician, hospital, or medical professional’s negligent act
or omission causes patient injury.100 Medical malpractice liability theoretically
promotes good acting physicians while deterring bad actors. 101 However, such
liability can also increase the risk that well-intentioned physicians will
compromise patient well-being to reduce their own risk of liability. 102 Section A
looks to the elements of a medical malpractice case. 103 Section B then examines
the potential issues with medical malpractice liability. 104
A. Medical Malpractice: The Claim
To establish a prima facie case for medical malpractice, the plaintiff must
meet certain elements. 105 First, the plaintiff must show the physician owed the
patient a duty.106 This duty is intrinsic in the nature of the relationship that begins
when a physician examines and treats a patient. 107 A physician has the duty to
provide “competent, compassionate, and economically prudent care” that is in the
best interest of the patient.108 “Mutual trust” is the foundation of the patient–
optimal standard of care to address liability during the opioid crisis).
99. See generally Rebeccha L. Haffajee, Marc R. Larochelle & Y. Tony Yang, Managing Increasing
Liability Risks Related to Opioid Prescribing, 130 AM. J. OF MED. 249 (2017) (describing the different types of
liabilities physicians face, including civil, criminal, and administrative liability from respective state medical
boards).
100. Haffajee, Larochelle & Yang, supra note 99, at 249; AM. BOARD OF PROF. LIABILITY ATT’YS,
supra note 17.
101. See Daniel P. Kessler, The Effects of Liability Rules on Medical Malpractice, THE NAT’L BUREAU
OF ECON. RES., https://www.nber.org/reporter/winter00/kessler.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing deterrence of bad faith physician conduct as one of the social
goals of medical malpractice liability).
102. Haffajee, Larochelle & Yang, supra note 99, at 249.
103. Infra Section III.A.
104. Infra Section III.B.
105. See Guerra v. Advanced Pain Ctrs. S.C., 122 N.E.3d 345, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (“To succeed on a
medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove (i) the standard of care a medical provider should have
followed, (ii) the defendant failed to meet the standard of care, and (iii) the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately
caused by the defendant’s failure to meet the standard of care.”).
106. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 467 CLINICAL
ORTHOPAEDICS RELATED RES. 339, 339 (2009).
107. See Valarie Blake, When Is a Patient-Physician Relationship Established?, AMA J. OF ETHICS (May
2012), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/when-patient-physician-relationship-established/2012-05 (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Once the physician consensually enters into a relationship
with a patient in any of these ways, a legal contract is formed in which the physician owes a duty to that patient
to continue to treat or properly terminate the relationship.”).
108.
The
Physician-Patient
Relationship,
N.C.
MED.
BOARD
(July
1995),
https://www.ncmedboard.org/resources-information/professional-resources/laws-rules-positionstatements/position-statements/print/the_physician-patient_relationship (on file with the University of the

241

2020 / How the Opioid Crisis Changed the Standard of Care for Physicians in
Medical Malpractice Suits
physician relationship.109 A patient likely can prove this element with ease by
simply showing that the physician treated the patient.110
Second, the plaintiff must show the standard level of care that reasonably
prudent physicians in good standing in the relevant medical community would
provide.111 Evidence as to the degree of care and skill the medical community
requires of the physician comes mainly from expert testimony that establishes the
relevant standard of care. 112
Courts require a member of the profession that either practices in that
medical field or is sufficiently familiar with it to explain what a physician should
do or refrain from doing under the particular circumstances. 113 This testimony
ultimately aids the fact-finder in determining whether the physician’s conduct
constitutes negligence, i.e., if the physician’s conduct falls below the professional
standard of care.114 To help the fact-finder better make this decision, expert
witnesses describe complicated medical terms and concepts. 115 States almost
universally require expert witness testimony to set the standard of care because of
the complexity associated with these cases. 116
Courts also look to a second basis for the standard of care when deciding
whether the physician-defendant conformed with the customary practices of the
profession.117 This approach looks to the actual practices within the medical
profession instead of hypothetical practices that the reasonably prudent physician
standard looks to.118 If there are multiple acceptable customary practices,
physicians need to only follow one to stay within the standard of care. 119
While this rule may allow for more real-world consideration, it fails to
account for experimental treatments or situations where a physician’s best
Pacific Law Review).
109. Id.
110. Bal, supra note 106, at 342.
111. Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 583–84 (N.D. 1979); see Bal, supra note 106, at 342 (“[T]he
standard of care generally refers to that care which a reasonable, similarly situated professional would have
provided to that patient.”).
112. Winkjer, 277 N.W.2d at 585.
113. Sonny Bal, The Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS
RELATED RES. 383, 383 (2009).
114. Id.
115. Anjelica Cappellino, The Standard of Care for Medical Malpractice: What You Need to Know, THE
EXPERT INST. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/standard-care-medical-malpractice-needknow/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
116. Bal, supra note 113, at 383; see Cappellino, supra note 115 (describing how in New York, attorneys
must consult with an expert physician witness in order to bring a medical malpractice action); Heather Morton,
Medical Liability/Malpractice Merit Affidavits and Expert Witnesses, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (June 24,
2014),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-malpractice-meritaffidavits-and-expert-witnesses.aspx (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
117. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 163, 165 (2000).
118. Id. at 166.
119. Id.
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judgment falls outside the custom.120 It also might not promote the best physician
conduct because medically accepted practices do not always equate to medically
preferred practices. 121 In areas where there are multiple accepted customs, injured
plaintiffs must then prove the defendant’s conduct fell outside all customary
practices, which plaintiffs potentially could not do.122 Many states are moving
away from the customs-based approach because of the uncertainty it presents in
every medical malpractice situation.123
Third, the plaintiff must establish that the physician’s conduct breached the
duty of care by falling below the relevant standard of care. 124 A breach of the
physician’s duty can take many forms: injuries from a misdiagnosis, errors in
choice or execution of medical procedures, or improper administration of
medications.125 Courts judge the physician’s actual conduct against the relevant
standard of care to determine if the conduct fell below that level of acceptable
care.126
Fourth, the plaintiff must prove two forms of causation: but-for causation and
legal, or proximate, causation.127 When proving but-for causation, the plaintiff
must establish a direct relationship between the alleged misconduct and the
subsequent injury.128 The common legal way of phrasing this is but for the
misconduct, there would be no patient injury.129
The other form of causation—proximate causation—is a question of legal
sufficiency.130 “Legal cause is a question of foreseeability and whether the injury
is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her
conduct.”131 Proximate causation ensures that defendants are not liable for acts or
120. Id. at 166–67.
121. See generally Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514 (1974) (finding a physician-defendant negligent in
not performing glaucoma test because it was the reasonable and most medically prudent course of conduct even
though performing such tests was not a customary practice in the relevant community); Peters, Jr., supra note
117, at 168.
122. Peters, Jr., supra note 117, at 168.
123. Id. at 170.
124. Joseph Kass & Rachel Rose, Medical Malpractice Reform: Historical Approaches, Alternative
Models, and Communication and Resolution Programs, 18 AMA J. OF ETHICS 299, 299 (2016).
125. Id.
126. Bal, supra note 106, at 342.
127. Bal, supra note 106, at 342; But-for Test, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/but-for_test (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
128. Bal, supra note 106, at 342.
129. CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 127; see Proximate Causation (Medical
Malpractice), CHAPMAN L. GROUP, https://www.chapmanlawgroup.com/practice_areas/proximatecause/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“But for the fact that you turned
off the oxygen, the patient would not have died. This is a cause and effect way of saying your action of turning
off the oxygen caused the death.”).
130. CHAPMAN L. GROUP, supra note 129.
131. Martinelli v. City of Chicago, 989 N.E.2d 702, 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); see James M. Varga,
Pitfalls in Proving Proximate Cause, 105 ILL. B.J. 44, 46 (2017) (“Essentially, ‘legal cause’ is a question of
foreseeability: whether the injury is one a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct
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omissions they should not have reasonably thought would cause harm. 132 To
establish a prima facie case for medical malpractice, the plaintiff must show both
forms of causation.133
Finally, the prior elements must culminate in actual harm to the patient
measured through a calculation and showing of damages.134 Even if the plaintiff
can meet the other elements of the claim, without a showing of actual patient
harm and subsequent damages, “a plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for
medical negligence.”135
B. Medical Malpractice: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
A bad result itself does not allow a finding of malpractice. 136 If the
physician’s treatment of the patient meets the applicable standards of care and
skill, there is no medical malpractice liability on part of the physician. 137 This is
because courts do not judge the medical result itself, but rather the physician’s
conduct and the methodology employed during treatment. 138 If courts just looked
at patient injury, medical malpractice would be a strict liability standard, only
considering one aspect of an overall claim without considering any underlying
fault.139
Applying this to treatment with opioid-based medications, if the patient’s
treatment satisfies the applicable standard of care, even an injurious result cannot
warrant a liability finding.140 This uncertainty highlights the importance of
creating a legal standard that protects physicians who act in their patient’s best
interest even when an injury results from the treatment.141

. . . whether the defendant reasonably could have seen the injury as a likely result of his or her conduct.”).
132. Proximate Cause, N.Y. CITY B. LEGAL REFERRAL SERV., https://www.nycbar.org/get-legalhelp/article/personal-injury-and-accidents/proximate-cause/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
133. CHAPMAN L. GROUP, supra note 129.
134. Bal, supra note 106, at 342.
135. Id.
136. Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 586 (N.D. 1979).
137. Id.
138.
Cappellino, supra note 115; see First Steps to Sue a Doctor, ALLLAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/medical-malpractice/first-steps-sue-doctor.html (last visited on Apr. 7,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting how many states do not let patients bring
forward medical malpractice claims without first proving their case “is at least arguably a legitimate medical
malpractice case” through an Offer of Proof or a Certificate of Merit which is many times reviewed by
physicians who write a report if in support of the claim).
139. Strict Liability, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/strict-liability/ (last
updated Apr. 2018) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
140. See Cappellino, supra note 115 (“A physician does not guarantee recovery. . . A competent
physician is not liable per se for a mere error of judgment, mistaken diagnosis or the occurrence of an
undesirable result.”).
141. Infra Part IV.
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Medical malpractice litigation has benefits and drawbacks.142 “There are
three social goals of malpractice litigation: to deter unsafe practices, to
compensate persons injured through negligence, and to exact corrective
justice.”143 Theoretically, the threat of litigation and its attendant costs—both
professional and financial—promote better physician performance. 144
However, the threat of litigation can also lead to what some physicians call
“defensive medicine.”145 Defensive medicine happens when a physician performs
procedures predominantly to reduce the risk of litigation.146 This is problematic
because it shifts the focus of the medical care from the patient’s best interest to
the physician’s best interest.147 Defensive medicine can lead to a level of care that
is not only unproductive but potentially harmful. 148
Ideally, medical malpractice liability should both promote physician
accountability and prioritize the patient’s best interest and well-being.149 To
uphold the viability of using medical malpractice as an avenue for recovery, the
legal standard itself should adequately protect all parties involved.150 One way to
ensure this is to alter the standard of care reasonably prudent physicians should
employ to factor in these concerns. 151 Deterring defensive medicine by creating a
different, more comprehensive standard of care would work to insulate
physicians acting appropriately while holding accountable those who are not. 152
IV. WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF CARE IN THE AGE OF OPIOIDS?
The opioid crisis generated a heavy caseload for courts across America: from
large class action suits against big pharma to criminal charges for certain
physicians whose patients died from overdoses to liability for physicians running
“pill mills.”153 However, whether the standard of care in medical malpractice
142. See Kass & Rose, supra note 124, at 300 (discussing the benefit of potential physician negligence
deterrence, but also the downfall of pressure from malpractice litigation leading to changes in physician
performance solely in an effort to avoid litigation).
143. David Studdert, et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 283 (2004).
144. Id.
145. Kass & Rose, supra note 124, at 300.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Serafini, supra note 11 (“Many frontline physicians and clinical leaders feel caught in the
middle – acknowledging the national crisis of opioid addiction and wanting to adhere to the new guidelines, but
also wanting to decrease patients’ pain.”).
150. Infra Part IV.
151. Infra Part IV.
152. Infra Part IV.
153. See Bobby Allyn, Purdue Pharma, Accused of Fueling Opioid Crisis, Files for Chapter 11, NPR
(Sept. 16, 2019, 2:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/16/761107097/purdue-pharma-accused-of-fuelingopioid-crisis-files-for-chapter-11 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting how
Purdue Pharma’s settlement with more than 2,000 local governments over its alleged role in creating and
sustaining the deadly opioid crisis lead it to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection); see also Erin Allday, Doctor
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cases can account for the complexities of the medical profession’s relationship
with opioids remains unanswered.154
Determining ultimate liability remains a case-by-case decision.155 While
there are many elements that make up a medical malpractice case, this Comment
only focuses on the standard of care reasonably prudent physicians should adhere
to.156 In cases involving the use of opioids, factors exist that establish a
physician’s rationality in making a decision to treat a patient with opioid-based
drugs.157 The new standard of care in the age of opioids should not look to a
simple prescription of the drugs.158 Rather, this new standard would encompass
these factors and consider the interaction in its entirety because that better
reflects the considerations physicians prescribing opioids must face. 159
Section A examines how a court’s decision finding a physician negligent for
his treatment of his patient with opioids provides an example for a new future
standard of care.160 Section B examines how societal and medical knowledge
about the opioid crisis should help set the standard of care for physicians’
prescribing practices. 161 Section C then proposes a new standard of care courts
should use that reflects the information physicians possess and how that should
shape their course of conduct.162
A. Koon v. Walden
In 2017, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision finding
physician Dr. Henry Walden negligent for his conduct involving the treatment of
his patient, Brian Koon.163 Koon alleged that Dr. Walden’s overprescribing of
opioid medications resulted in Koon’s opioid addiction and subsequent

Facing Murder Charges in Opioid Cases Was Already Under Investigation, S.F. CHRONICLE (Aug. 15, 2019,
8:31 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Santa-Rosa-doctor-facing-murder-charges-was-under14308285.php (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how a Santa Rosa, California
physician is facing murder charges after the death of five patients who suffered opioid overdoses); e.g. Del
Quentin Wilber, 12 Million Pills and 700 Deaths: How a Few Pill Mills Helped Fan the U.S. Opioid Inferno,
L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-pill-mills-linked-to-hundredsof-deaths-20190614-story.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (exploring how federal
authorities investigated and raided an illicit pill mill, which resulted in criminal charges against 140 people).
154. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18.
155. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, Medical Malpractice Attorney, The Simon Law Firm, P.C.
(Jan. 14, 2020) (notes on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
156. Infra Section IV.C.
157. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, supra note 155; Infra Section IV.C.
158. Infra Section IV.C.
159. Infra Section IV.C.
160. Infra Section IV.A.
161. Infra Section IV.B.
162. Infra Section IV.C.
163. Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
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injuries.164
Koon sought treatment from Dr. Walden after suffering a lower back injury
in 2008.165 Initially, Dr. Walden ordered x-rays and told Koon to use a muscle
relaxer and “ibuprofen as needed.” 166 However, Koon returned about a week later
complaining of continued discomfort.167 In response to this visit, Dr. Walden
prescribed Koon thirty pills of hydrocodone with one refill. 168
From there, Dr. Walden increased the prescription from six pills a day to
almost forty pills a day, using three different prescriptions. 169 Over this time
period, Dr. Walden repeatedly ignored Koon’s phone calls, requests for visits,
and pleas for help with a growing addiction.170 Dr. Walden instead refilled the
prescriptions without even speaking with Koon about his addiction issues. 171
The prescribing patterns were so unusual that in July 2012, the pharmacy
called Dr. Walden and expressed concern about the large amount of prescription
opioids Koon tried to refill and ultimately refused to refill the prescriptions
altogether.172 The medications interfered with his ability to work, his
relationships, and eventually his “everything revolved around the opioids.”173
Only then did Dr. Walden acknowledge Koon’s severe opioid misuse problem. 174
The plaintiff’s expert witness described Dr. Walden’s behavior as
“excessive,” “colossal,” “reckless,” “extraordinary,” and “astronomical,”
exposing Koon to a very high risk of injury and addiction.175 The court noted that
this was “the very pattern of prescribing that state licensure boards and the DEA
are trying to protect patients from because it ‘exposes a patient to a very high risk
of dying for backache.’” 176 Plaintiff’s expert testified that these deviations from
the standard of care for treating patients with opioids led to Koon’s injuries. 177 It
was not Dr. Walden’s initial prescription that led to the negligence finding.178
Instead, it was “Dr. Walden’s complete indifference to Koon’s safety” after the
initial prescription that breached the standard of care. 179
This case provides essential insight into future like-kind cases: prescribing
164. Id.
165. Id. at 757.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 759 (explaining how beginning with the initial prescription in 2008, Dr. Walden increased
Koon’s daily dosage roughly six times the initial dosage).
170. Id. at 757–59.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 759.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 773.
179. Id.
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opioids is not a per se deviation from the standard of care. 180 Rather, it is the
failure to properly treat and monitor a patient that creates liability. 181
The expert testimony inferred that the standard of care is consistent
monitoring of the patient, not the initial prescription itself. 182 Dr. Walden’s
failure was not his prescription to Koon of the opioid-based pain medications for
his back injury.183 Dr. Walden’s negligence rested on the failure to take care of
Koon after that initial prescription.184 It was his failure to recognize Koon’s
warning signs of addiction that raised his conduct to negligent levels. 185
This case provides an important example of how a court could make a
negligence finding based on the entire physician–patient interaction through
expert testimony evidence.186 The court in Koon opened an important door for
employing similar metrics in future cases. 187
B. How to set the standard of care in the age of opioids
In setting the standard of care, courts must determine the acceptable conduct
of physicians in good standing in the relevant community.188 To determine this,
plaintiffs need to provide evidence of what most physicians would or actually do
in a particular situation.189
Prescribing numbers alone are a poor measure of physician competency
because such numbers do not accurately account for the reason behind the
prescriptions.190 Courts should not opine that lower prescription rates means
better conduct without considering the reasons for such prescriptions or the
actual patient treatment. 191 Even though individualized prescription rates might
be probative in individual cases, national statistics do little to speak to the actual
level of care physicians provide patients.192 Looking at the prescription rates
180. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, supra note 155.
181. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18.
182. Walden, 539 S.W.3d at 773.
183. Id. at 759, 768.
184. Id. at 773.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 777.
188. AM. BOARD OF PROF. LIABILITY ATT’YS, supra note 17.
189. AM. BOARD OF PROF. LIABILITY ATT’YS, supra note 17; Coulter Boeschen, Medical Malpractice:
Using Expert Witnesses, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/medical-malpractice-using-expertwitnesses-30087.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
190. Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 23.
191. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18; see Reynolds, supra note 92 (noting how
the CDC and FDA altered prescribing guidelines to stop physicians from “abruptly ceasing opioid treatment or
rapid tapering” in certain cases because of the potentially deadly consequences from opioid withdrawals).
192. See Andrea Finney, Growing Number of Doctors No Longer Prescribing Opioids, CBS LOCAL 21
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://local21news.com/news/the-opioid-crisis-finding-hope/growing-number-ofdoctors-no-longer-prescribing-opioids (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (talking about
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without considering the underlying cause of the prescription and reason for its
use discounts and distorts the view of the physician’s conduct.193
There are widely available opioid-prescribing state and federal government
guidelines that can help determine what a reasonably prudent physician would do
in the same situation.194 In 2016, the CDC released comprehensive guidelines
regarding how physicians can help curb the opioid epidemic. 195 The CDC wants
“to improve communication between providers and patients about the risks and
benefits of opioid therapy for chronic pain, improve the safety and effectiveness
of pain treatment, and reduce the risks associated with long-term opioid
therapy.”196 However, there are inherent problems with using only agency
guidelines as a standard of care.197
There has yet to emerge a clear or consistent pattern courts follow when
considering medical guidelines.198 Even the CDC’s guidelines do not apply to all
patients and therefore would not be useful in every case. 199 Agencies like the
CDC continue to change the proper guidelines as more information about the
drugs and addiction continues to come out, making it even harder to follow only
those guidelines.200
Agency guidelines might not best reflect what the law considers the
traditional “standard of care” for physicians. 201 The agency guidelines often
represent best practices, something the standard of care may not reflect because it
typically measures common practices which might not equate to best practices.202
While the CDC and individual states might hope all physicians follow their
how a proposed bill in Pennsylvania addressing faulty opioid prescribing led physicians to potentially provide
worse care to patients because of less time spent with them and greater strain on the medical system).
193. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18; Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin,
supra note 155.
194. See generally Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (determining that a
combination of information about the known risks associated with prescribing opioids from state medical
boards and the DEA and expert testimony established negligent prescribing from Dr. Walden that caused Brian
Koon’s opioid addiction); see also THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 304
(examining different treatment practices state medical boards address with their guidelines); Haffajee,
Larochelle & Yang, supra note 99, at 249.
195. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, GUIDELINE FOR PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS FOR
CHRONIC PAIN 1 (2016).
196. Id.
197. See Ben Rich & Lynn Webster, A Review of Forensic Implications of Opioid Prescribing with
Examples from Malpractice Cases Involving Opioid-Related Overdose, 12 PAIN MED. 59, 62 (2011)
(questioning the applicability of agency guidelines to the standard of care because of legal ambiguity about their
effectiveness).
198. Id.
199. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 195, at 1 (distinguishing how
these guidelines are only applicable to those patients with chronic pain, and not for patients who are in “active
cancer treatment, palliative care, or end-of-life care.”).
200. See Reynolds, supra note 92 (explaining the new CDC and FDA guidelines the agencies released in
April 2019 that clarify their 2016 prescribing guidelines because of new information about stopping opioid
treatment to patients suffering with dependence).
201. Rich & Webster, supra note 197, at 62.
202. Id.
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prescription opioid guidelines, most physicians likely do not.203
It is almost impossible to think that such guidelines would apply to every
situation, injury, and patient.204 There is no one medically accepted way of
treating a patient.205 Simply failing to follow medical board or agency
recommendations will likely not result in liability because such deviations from
the norm might not always result in harm or damage to the patient.206 Yet the
guidelines can and do offer real evidence as to the level of treatment the medical
profession should strive to achieve in that area of practice. 207
The guidelines could potentially supplement the expert testimony that
establishes the acceptable physician conduct.208 Having a concrete set of rules
might help a jury better analyze conduct that could be abstract and confusing for
non-medical professionals. 209 Such established and agreed upon rules in the field
allow a jury to point to something and compare the defendant-physician’s
conduct to the established rules. 210
Precedent exists in California that supports using agency guidelines in
addition to expert testimony to set the standard of care. 211 In Bergman v. Chin,
the plaintiff introduced into evidence two administrative policy guidelines to
show acceptable medical practices. 212 First, the plaintiffs introduced the Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research clinical practice guidelines for management
of pain care.213 Second, they introduced the policy of the California Medical
Board that prioritized effective pain management in patient care. 214 This evidence
helped show that the physician acted so outside the bounds of acceptable medical
practice that such conduct constituted negligence. 215 This case is an important
example of how agency guidelines helped set the standard of care. 216
Expert testimony will always remain a necessity in medical malpractice cases

203. Id.
204. Id. at 63.
205. Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 22–23.
206. See id. at 23 (“For example, courts have held that failing to follow every recommendation of a state
medical board prescribing policy is insufficient to establish a failure to meet the standard of care.”).
207. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 195, at 1–2 (providing
physicians with recommendations on opioid selection, dosage, duration, follow-up, and discontinuation).
208. See Rich & Webster, supra note 197, at 62 (talking about the ambiguity within the legal field over
how agency guidelines should factor into an applicable standard of care); Telephone Interview with Tim
Cronin, supra note 155.
209. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, supra note 155.
210. Id.
211. See Rich & Webster, supra note 197, at 62 (highlighting the case of Bergman v. Chin and how
plaintiffs used agency guidelines to show Dr. Chin acted negligently in the course of his patient treatment).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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because of the complexity such cases present.217 Guidelines alone will not
determine the standard of care, but courts should consider employing the
guidelines in addition to expert testimony.218 This combination of information
can help the jury understand the risks inherent with prescribing opioids and how
a physician should act when treating a patient with these drugs.219 Ultimately, this
can better show whether a physician’s conduct fell within the relevant standard of
care.220
C. What is the new standard of care in the age of opioids?
When considering what the standard of care is in these types of cases, courts
should examine a number of relevant factors and not just point to one of the
physician’s acts, such as the initial prescription.221 These factors can include
anything from the examination of the patients themselves and dosing to patient
education and referrals. 222 At the initial consultation, physicians and patients
should mutually set reasonable expectations for treatment with the opioid
drugs.223 From there, physicians should consider prescribing in the context of the
patient’s entire medical history.224
Hypothetically, if the physician considered these factors, courts would defer
to their medical judgment.225 The hope of employing this approach is twofold: to
insulate good acting physicians while protecting patients from potentially
dangerous conduct.226 In many of the cases where physicians faced liability for
their conduct, the physician failed to consider a full range of ramifications from
opioid treatment. 227
The Louisiana State Medical Board disciplined a physician for an extended

217. Cappellino, supra note 115.
218. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18; Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin,
supra note 155.
219. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, supra note 155.
220. Id.
221. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18.
222. Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 23.
223. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 64 (“[E]mphasis is increasing
on setting reasonable expectations and establishing mutually agreed-upon goals for the control of chronic pain,
with an emphasis on communication and safety.”).
224. Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 23.
225. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, supra note 155.
226. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18.
227. See Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (noting Dr. Walden’s “decision to
prescribe increasingly higher doses over several years–without adequate discussions with Koon about the risks,
without any monitoring system in place and despite warning signs that Koon was dependent and possibly
addicted” greatly increased the risk of addiction and demonstrated Dr. Walden’s negligence); see also Dineen &
DuBois, supra note 65, at 40–41 (describing the conduct of Dr. Jarrot, who prescribed opioids “without
consulting the patient’s other doctors, previous records, or hospital records” in addition to multiple prescription
refills, all leading to administrative discipline in Louisiana by the state medical board).
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pattern of mis-prescribing in the late 1990s and early 2000s.228 The physician
repeatedly increased doses of opioids without adequately documenting any
patient history or any continued evaluation of the drugs’ impacts. 229 The
physician prescribed the drugs without checking other patient records that
showed the patient’s history of opioid abuse documented by other hospitals. 230
While the initial prescribing did not create liability, the continued neglect and
failure to account for the full circumstances of the individual patient did. 231 This
suggests that the liability turns on the entirety of the treatment and not on just one
specific act.232 This is the conduct a court needs to consider in the standard of
care—not just the simple prescribing itself. 233
The true risk of addiction increases over time, further suggesting that
continued monitoring and patient surveillance is key to conscious prescribing.234
Many times, patients show signs of intolerance or addiction that a trained and
astute physician should pick up on.235 A court in Illinois elaborated on the “red
flags” a physician should look for in a patient. 236 “[R]unning out of medication
early, . . . requesting early medication refills, taking more medication than is
prescribed, . . . seeking medication from other doctors, requesting stronger doses
of medication, claiming pharmacy errors in filling a prescription” all were signs
the physician did not recognize, but arguably should have.237 The plaintiff’s
expert noted a prudent physician would notice these, and the failure to do so
resulted in a breach of the standard of care.238
This idea of fully accounting for all the circumstances is not novel. 239 The
CDC guidelines promoted the very same concept of conscious monitoring.240
“[E]valuation of risks prior to opioid initiation, careful ongoing evaluation of
those risks, and regular assessment of response to therapy” are all things
physicians should think about during opioid treatment. 241
The key to prescribing the drugs even in situations where the ailments

228. Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 40.
229. Id. at 40–41.
230. Id. at 41.
231. Id.
232. See Walden, 539 S.W.3d at 773 (explaining how Dr. Walden’s continual ignorance of signs that
Koon developed opioid addiction displayed his “complete indifference” to his patient, leading to the negligence
finding); Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 41.
233. Telephone Interview with Tim Cronin, supra note 155.
234. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 191–92 (describing how “OxyContin often served as an addict’s
bridge between the milder opiate painkillers and heroin.”).
235. Guerra v. Advanced Pain Centers S.C., 122 N.E.3d 345, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 49, at 35–36.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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warrant the use of opioids is the manner and precision in which physicians
employ them.242 “A thorough understanding of the potential consequences and
methods of monitoring patients for these consequences is essential prior to
prescribing opioids.”243 Such consequences include physical dependence and
tolerance that can eventually lead to addiction.244
However, physicians should not let these consequences stop them from
prescribing the drugs altogether.245 Physicians need not forget that opioids still
have legitimate and important medical uses.246 Prescribing opioids for patients
with moderate and severe pain is likely still the best course of action.247 For some
chronic pain patients, such as those suffering from multiple sclerosis, opioids are
still vital for treatment.248
Opioids remain an important tool in a physician’s toolbox for treating
patients.249 However, it is the physician’s job to monitor the patient and continue
to treat that person based on the individual’s reaction to the drugs. 250 The
question of what action the reasonably prudent, well-trained physician would
take must consider the inexact nature of medical practice and the complexity of
individual patients.251 Therefore, the standard of care should include all of the
approaches physicians employ to treat patients and reflect common mitigation
strategies.252
Individual states set their own laws about medical malpractice liability—so it
is a state’s job to determine the appropriate way of implementing this standard.253
When considering how exactly states can implement this new standard of care,
two potential options emerge: statutory implementation or court-imposed jury
instructions.254
State legislatures should not enact this standard through a statute because it

242. Cornell & Guarino, supra note 71, at 11.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 12 (describing certain steps a physician should take when treating a patient with opioids).
246. Id. at 10.
247. Id. at 11.
248. See id. at 10 (describing how multiple sclerosis “damages the central nervous system, including the
brain, spinal cord, and optic nerves” and likely requires constant pain management, which opioids are a
treatment option).
249. Id.
250. See Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (describing how Dr. Walden was
aware of the risks of his prescribing patterns to Koon, but continued to prescribe anyway without taking any
other precautions, contributing to the finding of his negligence); see also Cornell & Guarino, supra note 71, at
15 (“Judicious use of opioids should include evaluation of patients in advance for potential addiction and an
ongoing agreement with the patient to follow mutual guidelines.”).
251. Rich & Webster, supra note 197, at 63.
252. Volkow & McLellan, supra note 70, at 1257–58.
253. Bal, supra note 106, at 340.
254. Paul Yowell, Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative Standards: Texas’s Solution to Negligence
Per Se?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 109, 110–11 (1997); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power and the Process:
Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1840 (1998).
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would turn the negligence finding into a negligence per se standard. 255 In
negligence per se cases, the applicable statute turns into the standard of care and
juries base their breach of duty finding on a violation of that statute. 256 Therefore,
the liability rests on the statute’s scope and specific language. 257 Likely, a statute
cannot adequately capture the intricacies of the opioid-based treatments this
Comment explores.258 The inherent nature of these cases is fact specific and
broad application of a standard likely does not adequately measure all cases and
situations.259 Negligence per se standards inherently cannot appropriately account
for that due to their inflexible nature, and therefore, passing a statute is not the
answer.260
Rather, courts should enforce this new standard through jury instructions at
the time of trial.261 Jury instructions are likely the best way to account for the fact
specific complexities of each case while still following relevant legal
requirements.262 While jury instructions are not as legally enforceable as statutes,
they would allow jurors to consider the facts and complexities facing these
cases.263
Incorporating this into a jury instruction would afford the judge the
opportunity to clarify the applicable standard of care and any evidentiary
questions.264 Instructions about the standard of care the jurors should judge the
physician-defendant on would remind the jury to consider all of the
aforementioned circumstances in their decision. 265 Applying this standard
through a jury instruction could also allow courts the discretion to employ this in
other medical malpractices cases outside of the narrow realm this Comment
addresses.266
Courts can and should use the standard of care as an opportunity to promote
better physician treatment overall.267 Prescribing opioids is not inherently a
liability-producing event, and patients would likely need to prove something
more to recover against their physicians for injuries resulting from prescribed

255. Yowell, supra note 254, at 110–11.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 115 (“[N]egligence per se ‘places all responsibilities on a legislature that could not
possibly conceive of all cases to which its proscription might apply and that has not provided for civil liability,
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259. Id.
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261. Jury Instructions, 63 GEO. L. J. 544, 546 (1974).
262. Thornburg, supra note 254, at 1840.
263. Id.
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265. Jury Instructions, supra note 261, at 546–47.
266. See Thornburg, supra note 254, at 1840 (talking about the discretion courts have in framing jury
charges).
267. Telephone Interview with Kellen Galster, supra note 18.
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opioids.268 However, failing to prescribe opioids altogether and eliminating that
class of narcotics as a possible life saving pain treatment should not become
another casualty of the opioid addiction crisis. 269
V. CONCLUSION
Physicians are in a unique position to help end America’s opioid epidemic.270
Unlike big pharma or law enforcement agencies, “[p]hysicians typically interact
with an individual with a goal of improving the individual’s well-being through a
continuing relationship. One patient at a time, the physician hopes to meet a
secondary goal of improving the public health and safety.”271
Despite their medically acceptable uses, there is no question that opioidbased medications permanently changed the medical profession. 272 It is
dangerous to ignore current information about the nature of these medications.273
“Opioids are not panaceas for pain management.”274 With all the evidence
circulating about the toxicity of the drugs, physicians should take precautionary
steps when using opioid-based medications.275
Dr. Kellen Galster, an emergency room physician in Vallejo, California, a
community ravaged by drug abuse, highlighted the tough legal position opioids
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271. Dineen & DuBois, supra note 65, at 26.
272. See QUINONES, supra note 3, at 126 (describing how OxyContin changed how physicians could treat
patient pain).
273. See Physicians’ Opioid Prescribing Pattern Linked to Patients’ Risk for Long-Term Drug Abuse,
HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/pressreleases/opioids-addiction-physicians/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A physician
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274. Cornell & Guarino, supra note 71, at 15.
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put physicians in: “[t]o limit physicians for how they care for patients based on a
legal standard would be a huge shortcoming.”276 Creating a blanket liability for
employing opioid-based treatment neither curbs the epidemic nor promotes better
care.277
No one practice or standard can alleviate all the risks associated with these
drugs, and physicians are not the only party that needs to change their tactics to
address the crisis. 278 Further, this Comment only addresses the risks associated
with controlled, medicinal uses of opioid drugs, which is by no means the only
contributor to America’s drug crisis. 279 Additionally, physicians do not control
the flow of heroin—a drug that caused potentially more societal harm than
prescription opioids.280
However, physicians can and should use their specific role as a bridge
between patients and pharmaceutical companies to encourage safe and
responsible use of opioids.281 In addition to administrative and criminal liability,
courts should employ a standard of care in medical malpractice liability that
promotes best physician practices. 282 Acting on this information by continually
monitoring patients provides a better answer for all parties involved.283
No one solution can end America’s opioid addiction crisis because that takes
a coordinated societal effort.284 However, physicians can “one patient at a time”
do their part to help curb America’s opioid epidemic. 285
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